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Chris Lorenz’s 
idea of conceptual 
inversion
Ewa Domańska
Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań 
In the following text I will focus on Chris Lorenz’s 
ideas which, from my point of view, present a 
valuable contribution to the discussion about the 
contemporary condition of theory in the human 
and social sciences in general. I find particularly 
thought-provoking Lorenz’s idea of “conceptual 
inversion”, presented in the article “‘Won’t you tell 
me where have all the good times gone?’ On the 
advantages and disadvantages of modernization 
theory for history”. Lorenz summarises his view in 
the following way:
[T]he problems associated with the history 
of society are the consequence of conceptu-
al inversion. What historians of society basi-
cally did was invert the “traditional” positions 
they criticized (on the model of Marx’s in-
version of Hegel). As a result, the problems 
pertaining to the positions criticized were 
not resolved but only turned on their head. 
The “traditional” focus on individuals was in-
verted into a “modern” focus on structures, 
the “traditional’ focus on culture was invert-
ed into a “modern” focus on structures, and 
“traditional” emphatic understanding was 
inverted into “modern” causal explanation. It 
is argued that in order to escape from the 
conceptual trap of inversion new theoretical 
labour by historians of society will be nec-
essary … I would like to designate this “neg-
ative” defining reference to other paradigms 
as the reciprocal “negative bond” of scientific 
programmes. In science this “negative bond” 
is politically unavoidable, as it fulfils strate-
gic functions in scientific controversies. Just 
as in the “political field” so in the “scientific 
field”: there is no struggle without a strategy. 
Epistemologically - that means cognitively - 
a “negative bond”, however, also brings im-
portant negative consequences with it in the 
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long term. This is because the methodological and theoretical views of scientific programmes 
to a certain extent embody negations, i.e. “inversions” of the views being criticized by them. And 
because in inversions the fundamental conceptual structure of that which has been inverted 
remains the same (just as the teleological structure of history in Hegel’s idealism survived 
in its materialistic “inversion” by Marx), many of the conceptual problems connected with the 
criticized positions survive in this way. As a result they can develop into permanent “epistemo-
logical blockades” demanding new theoretical effort to overcome them. Again, the teleology 
in Marx’s conception of history deriving from the inversion of Hegel is a clear case in point.1
My first question is as follows: Lorenz’s understanding of a scientific programme seems simi-
lar to Imre Lakatos’ conception of scientific research programmes. Thus, what is the relation be-
tween Lorenz’s idea of conceptual inversion and Lakatos’ idea of reconfigurations of research 
programmes?2 How can Lorenz reconcile these two ideas, and how might the idea of intellectual in-
version be helpful for transcending Lakatos’ understanding of the phenomenon of “paradigm chang-
es” in the humanities, or - vice versa - how might Lakatos enrich his view of intellectual inversion as 
an explanation of this phenomenon?
The second question refers to Lorenz’s and my common interest in empiricism, however differently un-
derstood. Lorenz identifies empiricism as “positivism of facts” (“positivism with a small p” while “Positiv-
ism with a capital P is the covering-law view of explanation”). The idea of “conceptual inversion” allows 
Lorenz to define narrativism as inverted positivism (thus, as an inversion of the “positivism of facts”).3 
My approach is related to the so-called new empiricism and new materialism. The first one, popular 
especially in sociology, derives from a theory of Gilles Deleuze and focuses on rethinking the connec-
tion between theoretical and empirical research and methods in the study of reality. The new material-
ism calls for rethinking the traditional (Cartesian) concept of matter as passive, which – as it is declared 
– is needed because of biotechnological progress and recent attempts to break away from the west-
ern tradition of anthropocentrism with its reductionist concept of matter as empty, lifeless and lacking 
agency.4 I wonder if Lorenz sees any common ground on which his ideas, which emerge out of a criti-
cism of narrativism, and mine, which are located in emerging paradigm of posthumanities, could meet?
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